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Abstract
As competitive pressures increase, a market-leading manufacturing firm is likely to focus
on a strategy of product innovation. The rapid development and introduction of new
products is often an effective way for a firm to maintain technological advantage, and thus
maintain its market leadership position. Today, many firms recognize that successful
product development and process development are linked.
Process development does not necessarily imply invention on the part of the manufacturing
firm. In many cases, process technologies are available, external to the firm, that if
correctly sourced and applied, may greatly accelerate the process development, and thus the
product development effort. Nonetheless, those firms committed to product innovation
often exclude a focus on process technology as part of their overall strategy.
This thesis is based on the experience of a product development team of a medical
diagnostics company. Given the functional complexity of this new diagnostic product,
designed experiments were applied to the process development effort. Although designed
experiments identified critical process variables, interactions, and led to an understanding
of design space, the question of process robustness remained. Cpk analysis was therefore
used as a follow-up tool, to evaluate process robustness, and to therefore assess the overall
status of the process development effort. Given that the development effort required the
implementation of new process technologies, the thesis considers how a process
technology strategy is linked to the company's overall strategy of product innovation.
From the research, the following conclusions were drawn:
* Designed experiments combined with Cpk analysis is an effective statistical tool
for process development.
* A process technology strategy, which addresses technology sourcing, investment
and implementation is a critical part of a firm's overall strategy of product
innovation.
Thesis Advisors:
Donald B. Rosenfield, Senior Lecturer of Management
Thomas W. Eagar, Professor of Materials Science and Engineering.
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Chapter 1
1.1 Statement of the Problem
LifeScan, a market leader of home blood glucose monitoring systems in the
U.S. and Canada, finds that its competitive environment is changing rapidly.
As new players enter the market, and chip away at LifeScan's historic
technological advantage, LifeScan's strategy for product innovation becomes
critical.
The Manufacturing Decision Category Approachl is a technique to assess the
consistency of a company's strategic vision with its actual policies. Policies are
reviewed in nine decision categories, (see section 4.1). By utilizing this
approach, this thesis will examine the consistency of LifeScan's current
policies with its strategic mission to innovate. Emphasis will be placed on the
manufacturing decision categories of Production Technologies and Processes,
as well as Product Development and Organization. Specifically, the thesis
proposes that a strategy for product innovation is strongly linked to a process
technology strategy, i.e., a process technology strategy is essential for a firm
committed to rapid new product development.
Clark and Wheelwright point out that "all too often, development projects
means product development projects, the assumption being that process
technology can be acquired easily, if and when the need for it becomes
obvious. Unfortunately, such a view results frequently in the full benefits of
the product technology never being realized- the manufacturing process
simply cannot deliver the quality, cost, or timeliness the product requires. "2
In addition, Clark stresses, 'It is almost impossible to work out the basic
research involved in a new manufacturing process while a product
development project is trying to meet a preset time schedule, performance
1 Rosenfield, Donald B., Notes from 15.761, Operations Management, Strategy
Section, MIT Sloan School of Management, December 1992.
2 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Managing New Product and Process
Development, New York: The Free Press 1993.
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specs and resource utilization goals."3 LifeScan's Quicksilver team has been
engaged in the development of a new medical diagnostic product for the past
three years. The thesis will utilize the experience of LifeScan's Quicksilver
product development team to illustrate these two observations, and, in so
doing, will highlight the need for a process technology strategy.
1.2 Summary of Approach
This thesis focusses both narrowly and broadly on process development at
LifeScan, as is graphically depicted in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure
In a narrow focus, the thesis describes a series of designed experiments which
were run by a small team, within the larger Quicksilver development team.
Team members included the LFM intern, and three additional full-time
resources. This small team was charged with developing a pilot-scale
manufacturing process for a new diagnostic product. This experimental
approach was intended to produce results which would ultimately be scaled
up into process conditions for a production process. In a broader focus, the
3 Hayes, Robert H., Steven C. Wheelwright, and Kim B. Clark, Dynamic
Manufacturing. Creating the Learning Organization, New York: The Free Press
1988.
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thesis develops a strategy for implementing new process technologies, and
presents this strategy as a critical part of LifeScan's overall strategy for new
product development.
1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter Two establishes the context for this research by briefly describing
Diabetes, the Home Blood Glucose Monitoring Industry, and LifeScan's
position in this industry. LifeScan's strategy is presented in broad terms. The
Quicksilver development project is introduced as an example of LifeScan's
emphasis on new product development.
In the context of the Quicksilver development effort, Chapter Three describes
a series of Designed Experiments aimed at developing a pilot-scale
manufacturing process for a new diagnostic product. Research methodology
is described, as are results of each experiment. This experimental approach is
intended to produce results which the team can ultimately scale-up, into
process conditions for a production process.
Chapter Four utilizes the Manufacturing Decision Category approach to
outline LifeScan's current policies in several areas. Certain inconsistencies
are highlighted between current policies and LifeScan's strategic mission of
Product Innovation. The Decision Categories of Production Technologies and
Processes, Product Development and Organization are presented as they are
most strongly linked to LifeScan's strategic mission.
Chapter Five utilizes the experience of the Quicksilver development team to
expand on the decision categories of Production Technologies and Processes,
Product Development and Organization. A Process Technology strategy is
outlined.
Chapter Six summarizes all results. Based on the analysis of the Quicksilver
development effort, and the Strategy for Process Technology, the thesis
concludes with recommendations for future product development efforts at
LifeScan.
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Chapter 2
2.1 Diabetes and Home Blood Glucose Monitoring
Diabetes Mellitus is a chronic disease syndrome, resulting from an interaction
of hereditary and environmental factors. It is estimated that 5-6% of the
United States population, or 14 million people, have diabetes, with 650,000
new cases diagnosed each year4. Diabetes is characterized by an abnormal
carbohydrate, protein and fat metabolism, fluctuating blood glucose levels,
and a variety of end organ complications. The clinical management of
diabetes has been based primarily on controlling the level of blood glucose
within a range believed to be acceptable and safe from the risk of disease
complications. Diabetics typically achieve control of blood glucose through a
combination of dietary measures, exercise, supplementing their own body's
insulin supply, and use of oral agents.5
Research reports have suggested that "the devastating complications of
diabetes can be prevented or delayed by monitoring blood sugar levels more
closely"6. A mechanism for measurement of the level of glucose in the blood
is therefore central to diabetes management. Originally, measurement
techniques were complex, requiring specially trained technicians in clinical
laboratory settings. However, technological advances over the past fifteen
years have led to the creation of a one billion dollar U.S. market for self
monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG).
Today, SMBG products fall into two categories: Visually readable or Meter
readable. Visually readable strips require the diabetic to prick his/her finger
with a lancet, place a drop of blood on the strip, wait for a chemical reaction,
wipe or blot the strip, and check for a visual color change. The ending color is
then correlated off a chart to a certain blood glucose level.
4 LifeScan Environmental Scan, July 1993
5 LifeScan Environmental Scan, July 1993
6 Fisher, Lawrence M, "Diabetes Report May Lift Sales of Medical Devices", New
York Times, June 15, 1993.
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Meter readable products generally provide greater accuracy. The diabetic
pricks his or her finger with a lancet, and feeds a drop of blood onto a strip.
Through reflectance photometry, or electrochemical methods, the chemical
reaction is translated by a meter to a digital output of blood glucose level for
the patient.
The SMBG industry is dominated by three companies, who together account
for 90% of U.S. meter and strip sales: LifeScan, Inc. (a Johnson & Johnson
Company), Boehringer Manheim Corp, and Miles Laboratories. U.S. Market
growth has averaged 17% (in dollars) over the past three years. An annual
market growth of 10% is expected through 1995. In addition to the three
market leaders, there are several meter/strip competitors, and two strip-only
competitors have recently emerged.7
2.2 LifeScan, and LifeScan Strategy
LifeScan, acquired by Johnson & Johnson in 1986, currently leads the U.S.
market in home blood glucose monitoring. In 1987, LifeScan was the first to
market a "second generation" meter readable product: One Touch®8 Blood
Glucose Monitoring System. One Touch required no washing, wiping,
blotting or timing of the strip by the user. Accurate readings were
automatically displayed 45 seconds after placing a drop of blood on a strip pre-
positioned in the meter. The meter was additionally capable of storing up to
250 readings for patient and/or physician tracking of trends in blood glucose
levels. This technologically superior product allowed LifeScan to achieve
significant market share by 1990. In 1991, LifeScan broadened the
technological gap between itself and competitors even further by introducing
One Touch II8. By this time, brand awareness and a highly reputable
customer service organization led LifeScan to a market leadership position in
the U.S. and Canada. LifeScan currently has a 47% share of meter placements
in the U.S. and has held its market leader position since October of 1991.
7LifeScan Environmental San July 1993
8 One Touch ® and One Touch II® are registered trademarks of LifeScan, Inc., a Johnson &
Johnson Company.
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Although LifeScan currently retains its U.S. and Canadian market leadership
position, the competitive environment for home blood glucose marketing
has since changed dramatically. By late 1994, LifeScan's two primary
competitors are expected to introduce second generation meter readable
products which may essentially eliminate LifeScan's technological advantage.
In addition, smaller competitors have introduced meter readable products
with certain technological advantages to OneTouch. While LifeScan
continues to differentiate itself through its superior customer service, product
innovation has now become essential toward assuring continued market
leadership.
The introduction of low cost off-brand strips by two new players in the home
blood glucose monitoring market has further complicated the competitive
environment. These strips may be used with LifeScan's meters, and are
available at roughly 75% of the retail cost of LifeScan's strips. LifeScan
maintains that these products violate their patents. At this time, the effect of
legal actions taken by LifeScan to block this form of competition is unknown.
In any case, lower cost off-brand strips have heightened the need for LifeScan
to differentiate itself from competitors. A broader product line may enable
this.
2.3 The Quicksilver Product Development Effort
Recognizing the importance of product innovation in maintaining
competitive advantage, in May of 1991, LifeScan formed its first cross-
functional development team, code-named "Quicksilver". The team was
charged with developing a new diagnostic product in a "fast" time frame.
The development effort was estimated to last eighteen months. LifeScan
would be the first to market this type of product, which would broaden its
current product line, open up new markets, and help to maintain LifeScan's
image as a technological leader in home blood glucose monitoring.
To date, the Quicksilver team has been together for about three years, and a
reliable process has yet to be developed. (Fortunately for LifeScan, no
competitive product has been introduced during this time-frame.) Several
factors have contributed to this delay in product introduction:
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Only a few months after its formation, the team discovered that successful
development of this product would require LifeScan to learn about and
integrate new process technologies. The technology of LifeScan's current
product was essentially non-transferable. Further, as a one-product, one-
process company, LifeScan had no formal strategy in place for connecting
itself with and/or importing new process technologies.
The Quicksilver team's challenge was increased by the fact that this new
product is functionally more complex than LifeScan's current product.
Consistent product performance relies on a complex chemical interaction
between materials properties and coatings applied. Product performance is
sensitive to a large number of process variables relating to coating method,
drying method, materials and coating formulations. In addition, the team's
experience to date strongly suggests that interactions between variables are
present.
Pressure for the fast cycle team to rapidly develop this product caused the
project to advance prematurely from an R&D phase to a production phase.
Decisions to purchase production equipment were made prior to really
understanding the process. Tied to production equipment that may not be
optimal, the team's process development efforts over the past year have
primarily involved one-factor-at-a-time experimentation, or arbitrary
selection and manipulation of process variables suspected to significantly
affect desired responses. Although many relationships between process
variables and responses were suspected, as were many interactions between
responses, (estimated to be 1000's),these relationships had not been quantified
or formally demonstrated. While pressure to introduce the product
increased, many questions remained as to how to develop a reproducible
process.
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Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
The thesis project presented an opportunity to take the process back to the lab;
to a controllable environment, where the effect of multiple process variables
and interactions could be measured and understood. While a portion of the
team was dedicated to developing a manufacturing process on production
equipment, the thesis project allowed for a pilot scale focus on process
development.
3.2 Overview of the Manufacturing Process
Prior to discussing the designed experiment approach to pilot process
development, it is helpful to provide an overview of the manufacturing
process steps for this new diagnostic product:
1. Coating and drying of Membrane
The coating process involves multiple steps. For each, a porous membrane
substrate is coated with a chemical formulation. The membrane is
subsequently dried.
2. Lamination of Polyester to Membrane
A polyester substrate is laminated to the coated membrane.
3. Strip Assembly
Additional layers of polyester are laminated onto the coated structure. For
these experiments, the assemblies are cut into cards.
4. Slicing
Individual strips, which represent the finished product, are sliced apart.
Of the four manufacturing process steps, coating and drying of the membrane
was suspected by the team to be most critical, in terms of its effect on end
product performance, and sensitivity to a large number of process variables.
The pilot process development effort, therefore, focused on this step only.
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3.3 Experimental Methodology
Experimental Design was the chosen scientific approach toward process
development. For this application, Response Surface Methodology (RSM)9
was chosen over Taguchi Experimental Design. Although Taguchi
methodology has several strengths, it incorporates certain assumptions which
render it inappropriate for this particular application. First, the structure of
Taguchi arrays assumes that no unintended interactions exist between input
parameters. As mentioned previously, several interactions were suspected,
but not known to exist in this system. Second, the Taguchi approach is
limited in its ability to identify the optimal. A Taguchi Design's ability to
identify optimal conditions is limited by the experimenters up-front
knowledge of the process. In other words, it is impossible to extrapolate
optimum conditions from experimental data. The optimum conditions in a
Taguchi experiment must be a combination of the exact parameter levels used
as inputs. The implicit assumption in Taguchi Design is that the process is
fairly well understood from the onset of experimentation. This was clearly
not the case for the Quicksilver development effort.
Alternatively, Response Surface Methodology assumes very little
understanding of the process up front. "The pragmatic use of Response
Surface Methodology puts a high priority on sustaining a better
understanding of the process system as well as estimating optimum
conditions. 10" Unlike with Taguchi design, the determination of optimum
conditions with RSM is not limited by up-front knowledge of the process.
Response Surface Methodology provides a sequential approach toward
process development and optimization, and can be used to effectively answer
the following questions:
"1. How is a particular response affected by a set of variables over some
specified region?
9 Hogg, Robert V. and Johannes Ledolter, Applied Statistics for Engineers and
Physical Scientists. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992.
10 Myers, Raymond H., Andre I. Khuri and Geoffrey Vining,"Response Surface
Alternatives to the Taguchi Robust Parameter Design Approach", The
American Statistician, May 1992, Volume 46, #2.
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2. What settings of the variables will give a product or process satisfying
desirable specifications?
3. What settings of the variables will yield a maximum (or minimum)
response, and what is the local geography of the response surface near this
maximal (or minimal) value?"1 1
The following general RSM path was applied to this process development
effort:
1. A First Order Screening Design, Linear Model.
Even though the linear model is not likely to provide an adequate description
of the system, it usually provides a good starting point for the analysis.
Variables are evaluated for significance. Non-significant variables may be
eliminated in the next round of experimentation. Trends are identified, as are
starting point ranges for the subsequent higher order experiment.
2. A Second Order Design, Quadratic Model. This model will lead to surfaces
that describe minima or maxima. Contour plots are a convenient format for
interpreting results. Lack of Fit indicates the need for transformation of data,
additional runs and/or use of a different model. With no lack of fit, response
surfaces can be identified for each response. Overlapping design space may
then be determined: settings for each variable are identified which yield
satisfactory levels across all responses.
3.4 Overview of The Pilot Scale Designed Experiments
The process development project consisted of several experiments designed
by the team, summarized in table 3.1. The team utilized a hand-coating
method in the first two experiments to simulate the production process. Two
major limitations to the hand coating method included variability introduced
11 Myers, Raymond H., Andre I. Khuri and Geoffrey Vining,"Response Surface
Alternatives to the Taguchi Robust Parameter Design Approach", The
American Statistician, May 1992, Volume 46, #2.
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by the operator, and the inability to create the positioning of coatings required
for full functionality of the end product. To overcome these limitations, and
to improve the pilot process development effort, the team designed and built
a bench top pilot coater. The bench top pilot coater's purpose was to automate
the hand-coating process. The team designed this equipment to greatly
reduce variability, to have the capability to produce fully functional end-
product, and to allow for the flexibility to evaluate alternate coating
techniques. The first two hand-coated experiments were run while the bench
top pilot coater was being built. The team initiated protocol testing with the
bench top coater immediately upon its arrival. Subsequent to the internship,
remaining team members utilized the coater in the third designed
experiment. Although the thesis will describe the design of this third
experiment, results will not be included.
Experiment
Designed Experiment #1
Designed Experiment #2
Protocol Testing
Designed Experiment #3
Purpose
Screening
Optimization
Debugging,
testing for
consistency.
Optimization
Model
Linear
Quadratic
Partial
Cubic
Process Method
Hand-Coating
Hand-Coating
Pilot Coater
Pilot Coater
Table 3.1: Series of Designed Experiments for pilot process development.
3.5 Designed Experiment #1
Selection of Response Variables (Outputs)
The response variables for this new product were chosen to represent the
responses by which the customer bases product performance. Knowledge of
responses for the current product, as well as information from customer focus
groups (held by the team's marketing manager) led to identifying the
following response variables:
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Reaction Time
Elapsed time from application of blood to generation of a blood glucose
measurement.
Color
A quantitative measurement of the degree of color change, corresponding to a
particular blood glucose value.
Hemolysis Time
Elapsed time from application of blood to breakthrough of red blood cells, and
thus an appearance of red color.
Hemolysis Degree
A quantitative measurement of the degree to which hemolysis occurs, i.e.
how severe is the breakthrough of red blood cells, or how much is the color
affected?
Spread of Data was included as an additional response variable to assess the
variability of the hand-coated process, and any changes to that variability
between cases. (This response was included to assure that the level of
variability of the hand-coating process was low enough to yield meaningful
results.)
Selection of Process Variables (Inputs)
As mentioned previously, a critical portion of the manufacturing process for
this new product (in terms of effect on end product performance) is the
coating and drying of the membrane. Based on the team's experience to date,
the following process variables were suspected to significantly influence
product response: (Note that certain parameters are disguised due to
proprietary reasons.)
* solids concentration of the first coating applied.
* membrane characteristic
* percentage of solvent in subsequent coatings.
* drying conditions.
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* coating parameter, denoted as X
* whether chemical parameter, denoted as Y, was contained in the first or in a
subsequent coating.
Each of these process variables was therefore included in the screening
designed experiment.
Inputs and Outputs of Designed Experiment #1 are graphically depicted in
Figure 3.1
Inputs
(Factors)
% Solids of Coating #1
Outputs
(Responses)
Figure 3.1 Inputs and Outputs of Designed Experiment #1
Selection of Levels'
Of the five process variables chosen, three are continuous and two categorical.
The continuous variables were analyzed at three levels, based on the team's
experience to date. Levels for each input are summarized in Table 3.2.
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Continuous
categorical
Level 2
% Solids of Coating #1
Membrane Characteristic
% Solvent in Subsequent
Coatings
coating 'arameter X
Drying Conditions
Table 3.2 Input Levels for Designed Experiment #1
Note: The process variable "Coating Containing Chemical Y" was not
included in the experimental matrix. For this categorical variable, each trial
was run at each of three settings, or "coating protocols":
Coating Protocol A: First (and only) coating: Contains Chemical Y
Coating Protocol B:
Coating Protocol C:
First coating:
Subsequent coating:
First coating:
Subsequent coating:
No Chemical Y
Contains Chemical Y
Contains Chemical Y
No Chemical Y
Testingl/Sample Size
For each coating protocol, four cards were made, i.e., 12 cards per experiment.
Six strips were tested per card. All strips were tested with the same glucose
level blood.
Analysis of Data
E-Chip Experimental Design Software was used to analyze all data. Consistent
with an RSM approach, a linear with center point model was chosen for this
screening experiment.
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40
1500
10
1
Low
80
2500
30
60
2000
20
2
High
Input Level 1 Level 3
Results of Designed Experiment #1
Highlights of the results of this experiment, and corresponding conclusions
may be summarized as follows:
* Each variable exhibited a high level (99.9%) of significance for at least one of
the response variables. Several variables exhibited a 99.9% significance level
across multiple response variables.
Conclusion: The team selected the "right" process variables for this first
designed experiment. Chances are, however, that not all relevant variables
were included.
* Across all coating protocols, variables ranked as follows in their effect
relative to all responses:
1. % Solids in Coating #1
2. Membrane Characteristic
3. % Solvent in Subsequent Coatings
4. Drying Condition
5. Coating Parameter X.
Conclusion: % Solids and Membrane Characteristic appear to be the two most
significant process variables.
* Coating protocols B and C showed similar significance for all variables
relative to all responses.
Conclusion: It is still unknown whether chemical Y should be included in the
first or the subsequent coatings.
* For all coating protocols, coating parameter X, level 2, was consistently
reported as significant.
Conclusion: Future experiments should eliminate this variable; level 2 of
coating parameter X should always be incorporated.
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* Adding subsequent coatings, (from coating protocol A to C), increased the
overall significance of drying conditions across response variables.
Conclusion: The next experiment should examine drying conditions more
closely, by separating this process variable for coating #1 vs. subsequent
coatings.
* For all coating protocols, drying condition "high" was consistently reported
as significant.
Conclusion: Future experiments should examine a range of drying
conditions built around "high".
· Several trade-offs exist between variables and responses. Specifically:
Reaction time favors a 40% solids level in coating #1.
Color favors an 80% solids level in coating #1.
Reaction time favors a Membrane Characteristic of 2500.
Color favors a Membrane Characteristic of 1500.
Reaction time favors a 40% solvent level in the subsequent coatings.
Hemolysis time favors an 80% level of solvent in the subsequent
coatings.
Conclusion: The team has successfully identified these relationships, i.e.
trade-offs, and has quantified their magnitude relative to one another.
However, the team must conduct future experiments to determine the
particular settings, (if any), of process variables that are required in order to
satisfy all responses.
3.6 Designed Experiment #2
Consistent with the RSM approach, the team utilized a quadratic model in
the second, optimization Designed Experiment. The goal of this experiment
was to generate response surfaces, interpreted from contour plots, which
would define optimal sttings for each process variable across all responses.
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Based on results of Designed Experiment #1, the team incorporated the
following input and output parameters into this designed experiment:
Inputs
(Factors)
Outputs
(Responses)
% Solids of Coating #1
Figure 3.2 Inputs and Outputs for Designed Experiment #2
Selection of Responses
The same response variables, (i.e. end product performance measurements),
measured in Experiment #1 will be examined in Experiment #2. Spread of
Data was dropped, as it revealed no significance in the first experiment. (All
cases were identical in terms of this response, suggesting that the level of
variability of the hand-coating process was low enough to yield meaningful
results.)
Selection of Process Variables
Based on results of Designed Experiment #1, the team selected the following
process variables for this experiment:
* % Solids in Coating #1.
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* Membrane Characteristic .
* % Solvent in subsequent coatings.
* Drying conditions for coating #1
* Drying conditions for subsequent coatings.
* Coating containing Chemical Y.
Two of the above process variables, Drying Conditions and Coating
containing Chemical Y, warrant further comment:
* Drying Conditions
Designed Experiment #1 indicated that the effect of drying conditions changed
in moving from one to multiple coatings (from coating protocol A to C).
Designed Experiment #2 will therefore treat Drying Conditions of the first
coating and Drying Conditions of the subsequent coatings as individual
process variables. Given the significance of drying condition "high" in the
first experiment, this experiment will focus on a range of drying conditions
surrounding the high level for each coating.
* Coating Containing Chemical Y (First vs. Subsequent)
This experiment will once again attempt to address the team's question as to
whether to add Chemical Y to the first or the subsequent coatings. (Results of
experiment #1 did not provide clear direction for this process variable.)
Selection of Levels
All five process variables for Designed Experiment #2 were continuous.
Variables were analyzed at three levels, as shown in Table 3.3.
Continuous
Input
% Solids of Coating #1
Membrane Characteristic
% EtOH in Coating F2
Drying Conditions,
Coating #1
Drying Conditions,
Coating #2
Level 1
50
1500
10
5
5
Level 2
60
2000
20
15
15
Table 3.3 Input Levels for Designed Experiment #2
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Level 3
70
2500
30
25
25
v
As in Experiment #1, the process variable "coating containing Chemical Y"
was not included in the matrix. Each trial was run with two coating
protocols:
Coating Protocol A: Chemical Y contained in first coating.
Coating Protocol B: Chemical Y contained in subsequent coatings.
Testing/ Sample Size
For each coating protocol, two cards were made; i.e. four cards per experiment.
Three strips were tested per card. Strips from each case were tested with two
blood glucose levels.
Analysis of Data
The team utilized E-Chip Experimental Design Software to analyze all data.
Following the RSM path, the team chose a quadratic model for this
experiment. Given that results identified Membrane Characteristic and %
Solids in Coating #1 as the two most significant variables, the team generated
contour plots in the following format:
Primary Axes: Membrane Characteristic, % Solids
Off Axes: % Solvent, Drying Conditions for Coating #1,
Drying Conditions for subsequent coatings.
Design Analysis Approach
The team followed a four step approach in analyzing data from Designed
Experiment #2, as shown below:
Step 1: Generate contour plots in the format described above for each case
across all four response variables.
Step 2: Identify a "design window" for each variable: Determine a range of
Membrane Characteristic and % Solids which yielded "acceptable" response
levels for each response variable.
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(Table 3.4 lists "internal specifications" for each response variable which were
used to identify design windows.)
Step 3: Within one coating protocol, identify any overlap in design windows
across all response variables. (Theoretically, this range of Membrane
Characteristic and % Solids would yield acceptable levels across all response
variables.)
Step 4: Select the coating protocol corresponding to the largest design space as
representative of the most robust process.
(See Figure A.1 for comparative design space of protocol A vs. B.)
Response
Color
Reaction Time
Hemolysis Time
Hemolysis Degree
Internal Specification
> 125 gray scale units.
<R seconds
> H seconds
<25
Table 3.4 Criteria for Defining Design Window
Results of Designed Experiment #2
Highlights of the results of this experiment, and corresponding conclusions
may be summarized as follows:
* E-Chip results indicated a Lack of Fit in all cases. (Lack of fit indicates
discrepency between actual and predicted results given the chosen model.)
Conclusion: Lack of fit may be explained as due to any of the following
scenarios:
1. The wrong model was chosen, i.e. a quadratic model can
not accurately describe this system.
2. An insufficient number of experiments were run.
3. Certain relevant process variables were missing from the analysis.
4. An inability to control the process tightly enough and thus
prevent large amounts of scatter in resulting data.
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In any case, "lack of fit" results precluded this experiment from yielding
optimal settings for process variables. For the purpose of this analysis, ranges
of process variables were identified which yield acceptable responses. A third
experiment, utilizing the pilot coater, will be run subsequent to the
internship, to determine optimal settings. Consistent with the RSM
approach, an alternate model to quadratic (partial cubic) will be utilized, in
effort to better describe this system and to attempt to avoid lack of fit.
It is unknown, at this time, whether the benefits of a more accurate model for
this system would outweigh a suspected inability to control the process tightly
enough. In other words, "lack of fit" results may repeat themselves in the
third (optimization) experiment due to poor process control, despite the use
of this alternate model.
Note that the implications of "lack of fit" for this experiment are not severe,
in that the team could still learn much from the results. The "lack of fit"
results may be viewed as an inability to optimize the hand-coated process,
which is not capable of manufacturing fully functional product. In
attempting to optimize the pilot coating process, which is capable of making
fully functional product, avoiding a lack of fit result is more critical. (i.e. At
this stage of the experimental path, we are more interested in confirming
trends and defining general ranges of process variables. We're not making
fully functional product, therefore we are not yet ready to optimize)
* The team confirmed the existence of the trade-offs between variables and
responses that were identified in Experiment #1, and identified additional
trade-offs as well. Such trade-offs include:
Reaction time favors the 50 % solids.
Color, Hemolysis Time, Hemolysis Degree all favor 70 % solids.
Reaction time favors a membrane characteristic of 2500
Color, Hemolysis Time, Hemolysis Degree all favor a
membrane characteristic of 1500.
Reaction time favors a Drying condition level of "25" for Coating #1.
Hemolysis time favors a Drying Condition of "5" for Coating #1.
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Conclusion: Competing Responses are present in this system.
* Although these trade-offs exist, there do appear to be ranges for membrane
characteristic and % solids which yield acceptable response levels across all
responses.
Conclusion: Design windows are present. It is important to next relate the
existence of these design window to process robustness. In other words, is the
process capable of consistently satisfying the criteria as described by design
windows, given naturally occurring variability, etc.? Section 3.9 will
specifically consider the Design Window in terms of process robustness.
* The majority of significant responses identified by this experiment were
interactions. (See Figure A.2, describing response type by significance.)
Conclusion: Experimental design is an essential tool for identifying and
quantifying interactions present in this system. The "one at a time
manipulation of process variables" previously employed by the team is an
unacceptable scientific approach for this system.
* Coating Protocol B, including Chemical Y in subsequent coatings, yields the
largest design window. (See Figure A.1, comparing design windows for
coating protocols A and B)
Conclusion: Including Chemical Y in subsequent coatings rather than in
coating #1 results in a more robust process.
* The 70 % Solids level is preferable across all responses.
Conclusion: In the next experiment, the range of % Solids should be built
around 70%.
* For Membrane Characteristic, a tighter range surrounding the 2000 level
is preferable across all responses, but testing was done with one hematocrit
level only.
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"Hematocrit" is a measure of the concentration of red blood cells in a sample
of blood. Typical blood hematocrit levels range from 35 to 55. All testing to
date has been with average hematocrit level: 45. The team's experience to
date has shown that hematocrit level can influence the performance of the
strip; i.e. a 35 hematocrit blood and a 55 hematocrit blood with the same level
of glucose can yield a different response from the strip. (The difference in
response is most likely due to a difference in flow characteristics of blood with
varying concentrations of red blood cells.) This phenomena is referred to as
"hematocrit effect". Note that Designed Experiment #2 used one hematocrit
level only when testing. The team chose to optimize the hand-coating
process around the nominal level, 45, as a first step. The pilot coater
optimization experiment, Designed Experiment #3, will be evaluated with
three different Hematocrit levels.
Conclusion:
The team's experience to date has shown that a very low membrane
characteristic, (below the range explored in this experiment, i.e., below 1500),
seems to minimize hematocrit effect. Therefore, membrane with this very
low characteristic, (1000), will be included in the next experiment. In order to
study hematocrit effect, blood hematocrit level will be added as a process
variable.
3.7 Pilot Coater Protocol Testing
Upon arrival of the Pilot Coater, the team initiated protocol testing. The
process conditions for this protocol testing were derived as indicated in Table
3.5.
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Process Condition Derived From
1 A high level for Drying Conditions Experiment #1
2 Coating Parameter X, Level 2 Experiment #1
3 Chemical Y in subsequent coatings. Experiment #2
4 70% Solids concentration in Coating #1 Experiment #2
5 Laminating Membrane to Polyester Ability to more closely simulate product
after coating #1 process than hand coating allowed.
6 Membrane with very low membrane Ability to test hematocrit effect, since
characteristic. (1000) end product is now fully functional.
Table 3.5 Pilot Coater Protocol Testing Process Conditions
Results of Protocol Testing
Protocol testing yielded strips that were highly consistent in performance, as
measured by color, reaction rate, hemolysis time and hemolysis degree. Strips
had excellent color, reacted in the required time, and exhibited zero hemolysis
within an acceptable time frame. With the exception of hematocrit effect,
(which, at this point, remained an unknown), these strips come very close to
satisfying final product requirements.
The team repeated protocol testing one week later. Resulting strips
performed identically.
3.8 Next Step: Designed Experiment #3:
Pilot Coater Optimization Experiment.
Although protocol testing yielded consistent strips, with functionality
approaching final product requirements, the team agreed that it was
important to identify whether a design window did indeed exist which would
yield fully functional product. (Note that the Design Window identified by
Experiment #2 did not yield fully functional product, since the hand-coating
process was employed.) The team also agreed that hematocrit effect must be
considered when defining this design window. The team therefore planned a
Pilot Coater Optimization Designed Experiment to address these issues.
Inputs and Outputs of this experiment are shown in Figure 3.3.
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Section 3.9
Beyond Designed Experiments:
Cpk as a Tool to Analyze Robustness of the Process
Figure A.1 illustrates particular results of Designed Experiment #2.
Specifically, the design window for Coating Protocol B shows that a
Membrane Characteristic range of approximately 1500 to 2000 yields
satisfactory results across all responses. These results suggest that LifeScan
only incorporate membrane satisfying this criteria into the manufacturing
process. Such a recommendation next raises the question of whether this
Membrane Characteristic may be controlled tightly enough to satisfy this
requirement. Or, alternatively, the question arises as to whether or not
LifeScan's manufacturing process for this new diagnostic product is too
sensitive to variability that naturally occurs in the Membrane Characteristic.
Cpk is a statistical tool by which assess process capability. Specifically, "the
Cpk index was designed to compare the variability of some quality
characteristic (Membrane Characteristic), based upon the lower specification
limit, (LSL) and the upper specification limit (USL) while assuming the
average membrane characteristic (X) is equal to the desired target value." 12
The concept behind the Cpk calculation is that process variability must be
small relative to the acceptable range limits.
The formula for Cpk is shown below:
Cpk = minimum of (USLx ) or ( x- LSL
3 (std dev) 3 (std dev)
Interpretation of Cpk
"According to acceptable standards in industry, Cpk values of less than 1.00
are unacceptable, values between 1.0 and 1.33 are marginally acceptable, and
values greater than 1.33 are desired." (A higher Cpk value indicates a higher
level of process robustness.) "Today, many quality oriented companies such
12 Box, George E.P, William G. Hunter and Jay Stuart Hunter, Statistics for
Experimenters ,New York: Wiley & Sons, 1978
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as Ford Motor Company and Motorola are now requiring Cpk values greater
than 2.0." 13
Cpk for Membrane Characteristic
Using the range of acceptable "Membrane Characteristic" as determined by the
second Designed Experiment, (1500-2000), and calculations for mean and
standard deviation based on data from multiple lots of Membrane, the
resulting Cpk was determined to be .87. This low Cpk value strongly suggests
that the manufacturing process is not robust enough to handle the variation
in Membrane Characteristic that can be expected to naturally occur.
Note that the third Designed Experiment will expand the low side of the
range of Membrane Characteristic X down to 1000, due to the ability to now
study hematocrit effect (see section 3.6). Should the entire expanded range,
(1000-2000), yield acceptable results across all responses, the Cpk would
increase to 1.4, a "marginally acceptable value".
Implications for LifeScan
At this time, it is unknown whether Designed Experiment #3 will result in
an expanded range of Membrane Characteristic X, which would lead to
increasing the Cpk to a "marginal accept level". LifeScan must be sensitive to
the fact that a Cpk value below 1.33 strongly suggests that their manufacturing
process may not be robust enough to be profitable. LifeScan must therefore
consider techniques to increase process robustness. Such techniques include:
* investing in improving the membrane manufacturing process at the
supplier in an effort to decrease naturally occurring variation of Membrane
Characteristic.
· experimenting with the impact of a product design change on robustness of
the process. (Would an alternate, simpler yet still functional, product design
13 Box, George E.P, William G. Hunter and Jay Stuart Hunter, Statistics for
Experimenters ,New York: Wiley & Sons, 1978
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result in an expanded range of Membrane Characteristic which would satisfy
product requirements?)
* relaxing the product specifications to a certain degree, which will not be
objectionable to the customer. (Increasing acceptable reaction time, decreasing
acceptable color, etc.) In so doing, the range of Membrane Characteristic
satisfying these new product requirements would be expanded, leading to an
increased Cpk.
The three options listed above represent trade-offs in cost and product
performance. Nevertheless, proceeding with a manufacturing process which
is too sensitive (not robust enough) to naturally occurring variability in this
Membrane Characteristic is likely to result in extremely low yield rates, and
therefore, increased costs to LifeScan.
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Chapter 4
4.1 The Manufacturing Decision Category Approach
The Manufacturing Decision Category Approachl 4 is a technique to assess the
consistency of a company's strategic vision with its actual policies.
This approach assumes that consistency of policies and strategic mission is
essential to carry that mission forward. Inconsistencies render a strategic
mission a "surface mission" only, without the structure and/or infrastructure
to support it and make it happen. The technique is based on a "four level fit"
of policy and strategy. Specifically, the analysis focusses on the four levels of
corporation, business, function and finally category.
This approach reviews a broad range of policies, by focusing on each of nine
"decision categories" listed in table 4.1. Any inconsistencies that are identified
between strategic mission and policy are then tracked to a specific category,
highlighted, and hopefully targeted for modification.
Manufacturing Decision Categories
1. Facilities 5. Work Force Management
6. Logistics Planning and Materials2. Capacity,
Distribution
3. Vertical Integration
4. Production Technologies
and Processes
7. Organization and Incentives
8. Product Development
9. Quality Programs
Table 4.1: The Nine Manufacturing Decision Categories
14 Rosenfield, Donald B., Notes from 15.761, Operations Management, Strategy
Section, MIT Sloan School of Management, December 1992.
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Section 4.2 of this chapter emphasizes LifeScan's strategic mission. Section 4.3
then reviews LifeScan's policy for each of the nine decision categories.
Inconsistencies between specific policies and the company's strategic mission
for product innovation are identified in Section 4.4. The three
Manufacturing Decision Categories highlighted as having the most impact on
LifeScan's strategic mission will be explored further in chapter five.
4.2 LifeScan's Strategic Mission: Past and Present
The 1993 Strategic Plan states LifeScan's strategic vision as follows: "LifeScan
will acquire, develop, manufacture and market products world-wide to
improve the quality of life for people with diabetes." As its competitive
environment changes, LifeScan can no longer remain market leader as a one
product company. LifeScan can no longer differentiate itself through current
product technology. Product Innovation is recognized as key toward
maintaining market leadership. In this sense, LifeScan's strategic mission
may be interpreted as one of Product Innovation, or New Product
Development.
A strategy of Product Innovation is not entirely new to LifeScan. Innovation
in the form One Touch, the industry's first meter readable product that
required no wiping, washing, blotting or timing by the user, launched
LifeScan to the market leadership position it now enjoys. This product
represented a significant technological advance in home blood glucose
monitoring. LifeScan furthered the One Touch Innovation in 1991, with the
introduction of One Touch II. This more advanced version of the meter
clinched LifeScan's technological superiority in the market, bringing them to
a market leadership position that same year.
Post 1991, a lack of new product introduction suggests that LifeScan's market
leadership position perhaps led to a feeling of decreased urgency for product
innovation. This is a classic trap for a market leader; the competitive
environment changes, its former technological product advantages have been
matched by competitors, sometimes at a lower price. The need for product
innovation surfaces as critical toward retaining market leadership. This
description applies to LifeScan. In 1994, with competition beginning to erode
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its market share, LifeScan is compelled to once again differentiate itself
through innovative new products.
4.3 LifeScan's Policy for each Manufacturing Decision Categories
1. Facilities
While LifeScan "facilities" exist in Milpitas, Puerto Rico, Canada and
throughout Europe, Manufacturing is split between Milpitas (primarily
coating, limited converting and packaging) and Puerto Rico (converting).
Further, LifeScan Milpitas is the sole manufacturing facility for the
company's primary product: One Touch Test Strips (Puerto Rico
manufactures a sub-assembly only.)
LifeScan in part recognizes that an alternate manufacturing site to Milpitas is
necessary as contingency to insure non-interruption of test strip production.
While LifeScan is willing to consider leasing, not purchasing, off-site facilities
to increase space, (an ongoing surveillance effort is in place to scout buildings
available for lease in the Milpitas area which satisfy manufacturing
requirements) the issue of contingency planning remains largely
unaddressed.
2. Capacity and Distribution
Capacity:
Capacity currently leads demand, but "as LifeScan concentrates on growing its
European Market, demands on LifeScan U.S. for manufacturing capacity will
continue to escalate."15.
LifeScan has a zero-backorder strategy for capacity, and utilizes a back-order
metric to track performance. In order to counteract poor forecasting and
cyclical demand, production generally builds in a 3040% buffer.
15 LifeScan Strategic Plan, 1993
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LifeScan's Puerto Rico site has space available for expansion of current
manufacturing. However, issues regarding work force skill level and
environmental concerns, (high external humidity levels with limited
humidity control, and a humidity sensitive product) have, to date, precluded
this option.
Distribution:
LifeScan's world-wide distribution occurs primarily through its Milpitas
warehouse. LifeScan ships U.S. products to wholesalers who then ship to
retail locations. European distribution is accomplished by shipping products
from Milpitas to LifeScan Distributors throughout Europe.
LifeScan's Customer Service Department's eastern U.S. shipments of
warranty products presents an exception to the Milpitas warehouse
distribution system. A Customer service Warranty Parts Bank is handled by
Federal Express in Memphis.
LifeScan is currently considering the establishment of an east coast
distribution site. Possibilities include converting an underutilized eastern J&J
company, or, as does customer service, utilizing a Federal Express parts bank
in Memphis.
3. Vertical Integration
LifeScan has a low degree of vertical integration; almost all components are
outsourced. LifeScan's policy is to maintain this low level, or to decrease it
further through establishment of supplier partnerships.
4. Production Technologies and Processes
The manufacturing process for LifeScan's primary product is robust enough
such that a "satisfactory" manufacturing process (i.e. one that results in a
fairly high yield of functional, consistent product) can be achieved by a low
level of technology. To date, no attempt has been made to upgrade this
technology.
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LifeScan realizes that investment in production technologies and processes is
required for new product development.l6
5. Work Force and Management
LifeScan's wage policy is to pay competitively with the medical diagnostic,
and other high tech industries. The pay plan is undergoing a transition from
pay for performance to pay for skill in certain areas.
LifeScan recognizes a deficiency in the number of technical employees. An
increased amount of University recruiting is planned to raise the number of
technical hires. LifeScan also utilizes professional recruiters to scout specific
technical talent.
A significant percentage of LifeScan employees are temporary. A high level of
job security exists for regular employees. (In order to reduce headcount, the
number of temps can be reduced in lieu of lay-offs.)
The current organizational structure is fairly hierarchical. Approximately six
levels exist for engineers/scientists and management tracks.
6. Logistics Planning and Materials
Inventory Policies
LifeScan utilizes a safety stock policy for its primary product, the One Touch
Test Strip. If LifeScan ever runs below safety stock, LifeScan holds its meter
shipments. LifeScan's policy is to forego growth of new customers for
satisfying the demand of strips for current customers. Approximately three
months of inventory exists in the distribution channel.
A separate inventory exists exclusively for customer service, (in a Federal
Express Parts bank in Memphis for eastern U.S., and in Milpitas for western
U.S.).
16 LifeScan Strategic Plan, 1993
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Vendor Relations/Vendor Development
LifeScan places high emphasis on establishing supplier partnerships.
Potential vulnerability from a single sourcing policy is viewed as less
important than establishing true supplier partnership. LifeScan's preferred
strategy is to build relationships with suppliers that will lead to their
investment in duplicate manufacturing lines dedicated to LifeScan.
LifeScan also lessens potential vulnerability by identifying alternate suppliers
for single-source materials in advance.
In 1990, LifeScan implemented a Supplier Quality Assurance Program.
A Supplier Certification Program is in place to move suppliers up a scale of
process control/quality, to the point where certified materials are inspected at
the supplier only, and are received by LifeScan directly onto the factory floor.
A "Supplier Recognition Day" occurs annually, to formally recognize
suppliers' contribution to LifeScan's business.
7. Organization and Incentives
Structure, Degree of Centralization
LifeScan is primarily functionally organized, and highly centralized.
Recognizing that new product development can best be accomplished by
cross-functional teams, LifeScan formed it first team, Quicksilver, in mid
1991. This team crossed a hierarchy of levels and functions. Although
members are 100% dedicated, they technically retain formal reporting
relationships to functional managers, and report indirectly to the team leader.
LifeScan has formed one additional autonomous cross-functional team
modeled after Quicksilver. When the development activity ends for these
teams, it is possible that management will fold members back into functional
departments.
Reward System
LifeScan's current incentive system is pay for performance. A bonus program
exists for hourly, salaried and management employees. LifeScan recognizes
that it's incentive system "must change to reward risk taking; and that
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execution should not necessarily be rewarded without consideration of
risk." 17 As mentioned previously, a pay for skill pay plan is in the process of
being implemented.
Costing Systems:
LifeScan is capable of tracking costs within a particular department only. No
project accounting system exists. Product development teams cannot track
costing. All projects are lumped together under any given functional support
group; costs cannot be effectively broken out by project. An initial attempt to
implement Activity Based Costing (ABC) was unsuccessful. (The current
incentive system led centralized, functional resources to overstate the
number of hours spent supporting product development teams.) LifeScan
continues to explore how to successfully implement ABC accounting.
8. Product Development
New product development at LifeScan occurs through one of three
organizational structures: The functional R&D department, a cross-
functional product development team with part-time dedicated members, or
an autonomous, fully dedicated cross functional team. Only two such
autonomous teams exist at LifeScan. Primarily, product development
remains a functional activity.
The Quicksilver product development team contains 100% dedicated
resources from R&D, Operations, Marketing, and Quality Assurance. Team
members report directly to functional managers, and indirectly to the team
leader. Members are classified as core team members, and non-core team
members. Core members, the most senior representative of each function,
are evaluated based on their own performance and team performance. Non-
core members are evaluated based on their own performance only.
17 LifeScan Strategic Plan, 1993
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While on the team, the responsibilities of team members are tailored to skills
rather than strict function from where they came. Functional responsibilities
are intentionally blurred.
Core team members are responsible for assessing technical challenges and
establishing schedule accordingly. Core team members are responsible for the
ultimate release of the product.
9. Quality Programs
LifeScan has implemented a Quality Improvement Program (QIP). QIP
training of all employees is mandatory, and Quality Improvement Teams
exist throughout the company. LifeScan's Quality Improvement Program
includes an extensive internal course offering.
4.3 Inconsistencies between LifeScan Policies and a Strategic Mission of
Product Innovation
Table 4.2 reviews LifeScan's policy for the manufacturing decision categories
for consistency with a Product Innovation strategy. 'This table classifies
categories as either inconsistent or consistent with LifeScan's strategic
mission.
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Manufacturing Consistency with Strategic Mission
Decision Category Yes/No Explanation
1 Facilities No (in part) "Stated" strategy to expand is consistent
with supporting new product lines,
however, no action to date.
2 Capacity No No clear strategy for expansion, unclear
if current capacity can support new
product lines.
3 Vertical Integration Yes Low degree of vertical integration
provides manufacturing flexibility
required for new product development.
4 Production Technologies No Low level of technology is inconsistent
and Processes with strategy for product innovation
5 Workforce No (in part) Workforce is fairly hierarchical.
Several layers of Engineering, Scientists
and Management is not conducive to
new product development.
6 Logistics Planning Yes Inventory Policy seems capable of
and Materials supporting new product lines. Emphasis
on Supplier Partnerships consistent with
supporting new product development
Distribution Yes Plans for East Coast Distributor
consistent
with supporting new product lines.
However, these plans currently on hold.
7 Organization and No Organization remains, in large part,
Incentives functional and highly centralized.
This structure is not conducive to new
product development. Pay plan does not
reward risk taking or team-work.
8 Product Development No (in part) Product development remains
primarily a functional activity.
9 Quality Programs N/A Quality Improvement Program
at LifeScan does not
specifically address new
product development.
Table 4.2: Consistency of Manufacturing Decision Category Policies
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4.4 Conclusion: Categories to Target
The decision category of Production Technologies and Processes seems to be
in greatest conflict with LifeScan's strategic mission. Because Manufacturing
Decision Categories represent both structure and infrastructural policies,
certain decision categories are linked. Targeting inconsistencies in a structural
category may not be effective if inconsistencies in a related infrastructural
category are allowed to continue. For example, the category of Production
Technologies and Processes requires an infrastructure as described by the
categories of Workforce, Organization and Incentives, and Product
Development. Inconsistencies in these areas must therefore be targeted as
well.
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Chapter 5
5.1 Structural and Infrastructural Inconsistencies
A Structural Inconsistency at LifeScan:
Production Technologies and Processes.
For the past three years, LifeScan has led the U.S. market in home blood
glucose monitoring with One Touch. When LifeScan first introduced One
Touch in 1987, the product represented a major innovation in home blood
glucose monitoring. LifeScan clinched market leadership with the
introduction of One Touch II in 1991, furthering its original innovation and
its technological advantage over competitors. From 1991 to the current time,
LifeScan has introduced two significant variations of One Touch technology.
However, during this period, LifeScan has not introduced a product
constituting a new technology platform. The image of "LifeScan as an
innovator" began to slow with the 1991 introduction of One Touch H. Since
this time, LifeScan's competitive environment has changed dramatically:
· Competitors are closing the gap on One Touch product technology.
Diversification, within, and outside of the Home Blood Glucose Monitoring
Industry, is recognized as key toward maintaining market leadership.
LifeScan recognizes that investment in production technologies and processes
is critical for new product development.
* The recent market entrance of off-brand strips, a low cost alternative to
LifeScan's current test strips, requires that LifeScan invest in production
technologies and processes to increase efficiency and lower costs.
A major structural inconsistency exists relative to LifeScan's current policy
for production technologies and processes and its strategic mission of new
product development. Namely, LifeScan's lack of investment in new
technologies seems entirely inconsistent with the company's critical need to
rapidly develop and introduce new products.
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Infrastructural Inconsistencies at LifeScan:
Workforce, Organization and Incentives, and Product Development.
Inconsistencies between current policies and strategic mission also exist in the
infrastructural categories of Workforce, Organization and Incentives, and
Product Development. A strategic mission of product innovation demands
an organizational support structure. Clark and Wheelwright strongly suggest
that autonomous, cross functional work teams are most conducive to new
product developmentl 8. If managed successfully, such a team structure
eliminates the frustration, delays, political and beaurocratic issues associated
with product development across strong functional boundaries and several
hierarchical levels. Theoretically, an autonomous team promotes
communication between functions, and intentionally blurs functional
responsibilities. Team members grow beyond their traditional functional
responsibilities, and take ownership for the product development process.
An appropriate incentive system would reward skills required by an effective
team member, such as team work, risk-taking, and accountability. A costing
system would aid in promoting accountability, by accurately tracking project
costs across functions.
A Manufacturing Decision Category analysis of current policies reveals that
LifeScan's organization is primarily functional, highly centralized, and fairly
hierarchical (6 levels of engineering and management). While two
autonomous, cross-functional, new product development teams exist,
Product Development remains primarily a functional activity. LifeScan's
current incentive system does not reward risk-taking or team-work, nor does
it promote accountability. Finally, LifeScan's current costing system is
incapable of tracking total project costs, across functions.
If LifeScan is serious about its strategic mission for product innovation,
changes to each of these policies, structural and infrastructural, are required.
18 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Managing New Product and
Process Development New York: The Free Press 1993.
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5.2 The Quicksilver Development Effort:
An Example of Structural and Infrastructural Inconsistencies
Quicksilver is one of two autonomous, cross functional new product
development teams at LifeScan. The Quicksilver development experience
may be used to highlight how certain infrastructural and structural
inconsistencies can delay new product development; i.e. can prevent LifeScan
from.achieving its strategic mission of product innovation.
The QuickSilver Development Effort:
Evidence of a Structural Inconsistency
The Quicksilver product is functionally more complex than LifeScan's
current product, One Touch. The manufacturing process demands a
significantly higher level of process technology. LifeScan's lack of investment
in this process technology forced Quicksilver to start from scratch. This
process development effort occurred during the critical path of product
development, and slowed the development effort significantly. As Clark and
Wheelwright point out: "It is almost impossible to work out the basic
research involved in a new manufacturing process while a product
development project is trying to meet a preset time schedule, performance
specs and resource utilization goals."19
The QuickSilver Development Effort:
Evidence of Infrastructural Inconsistencies
Team Structure
Although Quicksilver is LifeScan's first autonomous, cross-functional
development team, a support structure seemingly consistent with strategic
mission, there are factors related to the team structure which are inconsistent
19 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Managing New Product and
Process Development New York: The Free Press 1993.
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with a strategic mission of Product Innovation. Such factors are likely to
have contributed to a delay in product introduction.
For example, the team employs a "light weight management structure".20
With this structure, team members report indirectly to the team leader, and
directly to functional managers. At times, conflicting objectives between
functional managers and the team leader render the team more of a
"collection of juxtaposed functions" than a true team. The light-weight
management structure demands much external lobbying on the part of the
team leader, to assure that functional managers share the team's vision.
Furthermore, given that Quicksilver is LifeScan's first autonomous project
team, external focus is also required by the team leader to assure management
that a break from an historically functional organization is indeed supporting
LifeScan's mission of Product Innovation.
The time the team leader must spend as "external obstacle remover" may
detract from time required to remove "internal obstacles", (such as distinct
functional barriers between engineers and scientists). Such an external focus
may also detract from a required internal operational focus: such as time
required to pull together the team's technical efforts, and to enforce a system
of accountability for technical assignments.
Incentive System and Costing System
Although the team leader does have significant influence in the review
process, (especially of core team members), LifeScan's incentive system
remains geared toward a functional organization of individual contributors.
Finally, as a cross functional team, the absence of a costing system has
prevented Quicksilver from accurately tracking project costs. As product
introduction continues to be delayed, and costs continue to accrue,
management's need to understand Quicksilver's development costs grows.
20 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Managing New Product and
process Development. New York: The Free Press 1993.
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Implications of this inconsistency extend to other project development teams
at LifeScan, attempting to learn from Quicksilver's experience.
Summary of Manufacturing Decision Category Analysis
In summary, the Quicksilver experience evidences both structural and
infrastructural inconsistencies with LifeScan's strategic mission of Product
Innovation. The structural inconsistency is evidenced by a lack of prior
investment in coating technology. The infrastructural inconsistencies were
evidenced by team structure, incentive system and costing system. While the
Quicksilver team does represent a change to LifeScan's organizational policies
that is "more consistent" with mission, a truly autonomous team, with
members reporting directly to team leader, may enable the internal focus
required for a product development effort to advance. In addition, a strategic
mission of new product development demands an incentive system
consistent with this team structure, as well as a method which will allow the
team to accurately track project costs.
5.3 A Process Technology Strategy
A process Technology strategy guides the firm in acquiring, developing and
applying technology for competitive advantage. It is a critical element of a
firm's development strategy.
A process technology strategy is based on the premise that "when (process
technology) invention is included in a development project, it invariably
causes delay, backtracking, and disappointment. However, when done in
advance, so that its results are available for application, new technology
development may contribute significantly to project success."21 Basically, a
process technology strategy separates invention from application, by taking
process technology development off the critical path of product development.
21 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Managing New Product and
Process Development. New York: The Free Press 1993.
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This thesis proposes that a process technology strategy will allow LifeScan to
directly address those structural and infrastructural inconsistencies between
current policies and a strategic mission of product innovation. Specifically, a
Process Technology Strategy will focus LifeScan on policy changes required in
the categories of Production Technologies and Processes, Organization, and
Product Development.
There are three components to a firm's process technology strategy:
1. Focus
define those technologies where the firm seeks to achieve mastery or
superiority relative to competitors.
2. Sourcing
Should technology be sourced externally, or developed internally to the firm?
3. Implementation
A. Which individual or function is responsible for finding the technology,
and bringing it inside the firm?
B. Which individual or function is responsible for implementing the
technology inside of the firm?
Table B.1 describes the numerous choices available to a firm in a process
technology strategy. Choices are classified as "Finders of technology"
(Individual or function responsible for finding the technology, and bringing it
inside the firm) ", External Sources of Technology", and "Method of
Incorporating Technology". The following section, which describes elements
of process technology strategies at other companies, highlights several of
these choices.
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5.4 Elements of Process Technology Strategies at Other Companies
Hewlett Packard
Hewlett Packard's development strategy is described in Figure B.122. Hewlett
Packard allows business and functional strategies to drive "promising
technological opportunities." Advanced development projects are then
initiated around those technologies. A bank of proven technologies ("pizza
bins of proven technologies") is established, from which product
development teams may draw. In this manner, Hewlett Packard successfully
separates invention from application, and pulls process technology
development off of the critical path of product development.
Hewlett Packard's relatively short product development cycles and the
efficiency of its product development process serve as a model in the
industry. 23 A significant part of Hewlett Packard's success no doubt revolves
around the company's emphasis on a process development strategy.
Baxter Scientific
Baxter's strategic mission is "product innovation primarily through external
development" 24 To achieve that mission, Baxter has established a
"technology scout' function. The technology scout's role consists of
identifying external technologies consistent with Baxter's strategic initiatives,
and subsequently selling those technologies internally. The Scout categorizes
technologies by a "pyramid of needs". The top of the pyramid consists of
technologies with the highest probability of adoption, in that they directly
22 Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark, Manainn New Product and
proceu Development New York: The Free Press 1993, 95.
23 Ibid, 102.
24 Wolff, Michael F., "'Scouting for Technology", Research-Technology
Management, Jan-Feb 1992, Vol 35, #1.
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address current project development needs at Baxter. The middle of the
pyramid consists of alternative technologies or extensions of closely matched
technologies. Finally, technologies at the bottom of the pyramid bear some
relevance to Baxter's business, however no direct fit is apparent. As the
technology scout points out, the "sell job" becomes more difficult when
moving down the layers of the pyramid. The scout cautions, however, that
although risk of investment increases when moving from the top to the
bottom of the pyramid, technologies in the bottom level may provide
companies with a quantum leap in technology required to maintain market
leadership.
Financial Data (available through 1991)25 suggests that this process
technology strategy has allowed Baxter to remain competitive (i.e. meet the
industry average financial performance) in the medical diagnostic industry.
26
Westinghouse
A Corporate Science and Technology Center at Westinghouse is a centralized
function servicing all business units with process technology development.
The Center shares the experience of Baxter's scout, however, in that selling an
investment in process technology to risk-averse business units is at times
difficult. With a product obsolescence rate of 50% over a five year period,
Westinghouse was aware that investment in new technologies is critical
toward maintaining competitiveness. Westinghouse realized, therefore, that
it must directly address the business units' reluctance to invest.
Westinghouse established a "Business Unit Alliance Program"2 7, to
encourage investment in new process technologies by dividing financial risk
between the Corporate Science and Technology Center and the business unit.
The alliance program featured a "revolving loan fund", whereby the Center
25 Annual Report, Form 10K, Baxter Scientific 1991
26 Industry Norms and Key Business Ratios, Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services,
New York, 1992-3, Medical Diagnostics Industry, 74.
27 Barpal, Issac R., "Business-Driven Technology for a Technology-based
Firm", Research-Technology Management, Mar-April 1992, Vol 30, #2.
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would pay up to 75% of process technology development costs for up to two
years, with the business unit funding the remaining 25%. If objectives of the
project are met, the business unit repays 150% of the loan to the Center over a
three year period. If objectives are not met, the business unit repays 50% of
the loan over a two year period. Repaid loans are then used to fund the next
process technology development project.
The program also features 100% dedicated "dual program managers", one
from the business unit, and one from the center. The two program managers
agree on objectives up front, and work together during an initial period of
applying the new process technology to a product development effort.
Westinghouse's process technology strategy helps to remove the risk that
typically hinders companies from investing in new technologies. The high
product obsolescence rate faced by Westinghouse is clearly the driving force
behind these investments; the company's survival is dependent on finding,
investing in, and successfully applying new technologies. Aware of its
competitive environment, and the implications of not investing in new
technologies, Westinghouse depends on its process technology strategy to
encourage investment, and thus to maintain its competitiveness.
Polaroid
Polaroid recently implemented a new process technology, automated
presentation of small parts, into its camera manufacturing process. Over the
course of finding and applying this technology, Polaroid's initial interest in
automating camera manufacturing turned into a core competency of
automated small parts presentation; a competency that has since been tapped
by other industries on a consulting basis. In other words, Polaroid has
achieved competitive advantage by mastering a particular process technology.
Although Polaroid had no formal process technology strategy in place, several
factors that contributed to their success do represent critical elements of such a
strategy. These factors may be categorized as follows:
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Pre-implementation Factors
· CEO support:
In the early 1980's, Polaroid's CEO expressed "we need to change the way we
build cameras", and was willing to provide resources and investment capital
required.
* Ability to translate the investment in process technology into efficiency
gains and thus dollars saved.
* Creating a philosophy emphasizing "process".
The camera manufacturing manager asked his team to imagine Polaroid five
years into the future. He expressed to team members that while he felt
confident Polaroid would be in the hardware manufacturing business, they
may not be manufacturing cameras. With this response, he asked employees
to focus on process; to concentrate on being the best in the industry at
"automated presentation of small parts". Focusing on process, this manager
felt, would allow Polaroid the flexibility required to survive in a rapidly
changing competitive environment.
* Hiring an Automation expert, 100% dedicated, to manage the program
* Knowing what to ask for at a trade show; i.e. how to source technology
successfully.
In an effort to source process technology, the automation expert hired to
manage the program attended a trade show. At the Sony Robotic booth, the
manager ignored the robots on display, and asked to look "behind a curtain"
leading to the presentation of small parts to the robot. It was the automated
technology "behind the curtain" which was directly applicable to Polaroid's
needs. The trade show attendee, therefore, was knowledgeable enough about
the technology and Polaroid's needs, to successfully discover a source.
Factors During Implementation
* Linking development and manufacturing engineers during the
implementation process.
Overlapping responsibility of the developers and the users of automation
assured a smooth transition, leading to successful implementation and
adoption of the process technology.
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* Designing the product for automation.
Polaroid focused on process first, product second. The camera product
utilizing this new process technology was designed for automation. The
process was not retro-fitted into an existing product.
Post-implementation Factor
* New process technology attracted engineering talent to the manufacturing
site.
Engineering talent attracted by cutting edge process technology was hired to
successfully sustain and/or creatively improve upon the process technology
and its application.
Vistakon
Vistakon recently implemented a new process technology, in the form of an
automated pilot assembly line, into its contact lens manufacturing facility.28
Vistakon is known throughout Johnson & Johnson for its strong emphasis
on process technology, and the resulting benefits on product development.
Vistakon's investment in this process technology has resulted in the
development of a contact lens manufacturing process with efficiencies
unmatched by industry competitors. In other words, investment in process
technology has provided Vistakon with a dear competitive advantage. In
many ways, Vistakon's experience has echoed that of Polaroid, as evidenced
below:
Pre-implementation Factors
* Management support
* Ability to quantify (estimate) efficiency gains, translating to a reduction in
product cost, ahead of investment.
* Actual demonstration of efficiency gains, one piece of the process at a time
Vistakon separated the overall manufacturing process into modules, and,
through a lab bench approach, demonstrated to management the gains of one
process module at a time. In this manner, Vistakon successfully fueled (i.e.
28 Vistakon Plant Tour and Meeting with LifeScan, November, 1993.
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funded) investment in that piece of the process, and investigation into the
next piece.
* Dedicated team for Sourcing and Implementing Technology
Vistakon provided the organizational structure required for successful
implementation: Full time, members with backgrounds in the current
manufacturing process and/or automation.
* COSAT'S Involvement
Vistakon utilized J&J's Corporate Office of Science and Technology to
facilitate sourcing of Japanese automation equipment. COSAT's prior
experience with Japanese technology sourcing saved Vistakon time associated
with finding the source, and also helped to reduce cultural barriers.
Factors During Implementation
* Self-directed work teams formed to implement technology
Vistakon provided the organizational structure required to implement
technology.
* Linking development and manufacturing engineers during the
implementation process.
(Similar to Polaroid, to assure "smooth hand-off"' of process technology.)
Summary of Companies Experiences with a Process Technology Strategy.
Why is it important?
Hewlett Packard's process technology strategy contributes largely to reduced
product development times. A process technology strategy has led Baxter and
Westinghouse to find, invest in, and to successfully apply new technologies
required to remain competitive in their respective industries. An analysis of
Polaroid's and Vistakon's experience with sourcing, investing and applying
new process technologies suggests that the development of a generic process
technology strategy would increase the chances of these successful experiences
repeating themselves, with alternate technologies and products. In other
words, a process technology strategy could capture the critical elements that
made these technology investments successful, and could serve as a model
for future technology investments.
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Each of these companies shares with LifeScan the need to rapidly develop and
introduce new products; the need for technological innovation. These
concrete experiences and their resulting positive impact on each company's
competitiveness strongly suggest that LifeScan would benefit from a process
technology strategy.
5.5 Recommended Process Technology Strategy for LifeScan
An outline of a process technology strategy for LifeScan is shown in Figure
5.1.
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Figure 5.1: A Process Technology Strategy for LifeScan
This Process Technology strategy, as detailed below, is based on the
Quicksilver product development experience.
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I. Focus on Technology Consistent with Mission
The Quicksilver product development effort points toward
coating/converting technology as the relevant process technology for
LifeScan's investment.
II. Internal or External Sourcing?
Internal development of technology was the chosen direction for Quicksilver.
This decision will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
III. Define Finder of Technology
Given the decision to source technology internally, significant resources are
required for process technology development. An Advanced Process
Function, consisting of a team of technology scouts, is recommended. This
function would be staffed by members with extensive backgrounds in
coating/converting technology, who remained well connected to the
industry. The Advanced Process function would be responsible for
connecting LifeScan to sources of the technology, bringing the technology in
house, and developing/customizing it to the point where it could be used in
future product development efforts.
IV. Justify Investment in Technology
Given that coating/converting technology is not as conducive to quantified
benefits as is automation technology, a model of shared risk is recommended.
Financial risk for the investment would be shared between the advanced
process development function and the product development team.
V. Invest in Technology/Build Bank of Proven Technologies
Once feasibility is proven, this technology would then be "stored" in a bank of
proven technologies. Future product development efforts would draw from
this bank as required.
VI. Establish Support Structure Required to Apply Technology to
Development Effort.
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As discussed earlier, the preferred product development support structure is
an autonomous team with 100% dedicated members reporting directly to the
team leader. Integrating the technology scout with this team during the
initial implementation phase would assure a smooth transition from process
technology invention to application in the product development effort.
Figure 5.1 illustrates that, at this particular step, the Process Technology
Strategy becomes joined to the Product Development Strategy.
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Chapter Six
6.1 Summary of Results of Thesis
In summary, the thesis utilized the product development experience of the
Quicksilver team to focus on Process Development, and a Process Technology
Strategy for LifeScan. In so doing, the thesis directly addressed each of four
primary factors contributing to a delay in the Quicksilver product
introduction:
1. Increased complexity of Quicksilver product vs. current product.
2. Influence of a new organizational structure on product development.
3. Premature advancement of the project from an R&D to a production phase.
4. Inability to leverage current product technology, One Touch technology, in
the development effort.
The pilot process development project addressed factor 1, in that it allowed
for better understanding of the complexities of the Quicksilver product.
Contributions of this project are summarized in table 6.1.
Factor's 2, 3 and 4 were addressed by the Manufacturing Decision Category
Approach as follows: Primary inconsistencies between LifeScan's current
policies and its strategic mission of Product Innovation were found to occur
in the infrastructural category of Organization and Incentives, and in the
structural category of Production Technologies and Processes. The Production
Technologies and Processes inconsistency was then rectified by proposing a
process technology strategy for LifeScan.
Factor 2 was specifically addressed by reviewing LifeScan's current policies for
organization, as well as organizational issues faced by the Quicksilver product
development team.
Factors 3 and 4 were addressed by formulating a process technology strategy.
A process technology strategy would allow process technology invention to
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occur in advance of the development effort, to be stored in a process
technology bank, and subsequently to be withdrawn and applied to a product
development effort.
A major portion of Quicksilver's development time was spent on the
invention of process technology. If done in advance, as dictated by a process
technology strategy, the proven technology would have been called upon by
the team, and applied directly to the development effort. Time saved by
separating invention from application may have eliminated time pressure to
advance the project prematurely from an R&D to a production phase. In
addition, per a process technology strategy, a bank of proven technologies
would provide LifeScan with several options for leveraging technology; and
would not limit LifeScan to its ability (or inability) to leverage One Touch
technology.
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Contributions of the Pilot Process Development Project
* Suspected relationships between process variables and responses were
confirmed.
* Trade-offs between variables and responses were identified.
* Suspected interactions between process variables were confirmed, the effect
of which was shown to largely out-weigh the effect of single process variables.
* For the hand-coated process, a range of process variables, (a design window),
was identified yielding acceptable levels across all response variables.
* Cpk calculations applied to this design window raised concern regarding
lack of process robustness. Implications of LifeScan's proceeding with a non-
robust process as well as suggestions for increasing process robustness were
outlined.
* A bench top pilot coater was designed and built, providing the basis for pilot
process development, (i.e., the ability to test several process variables in a
controlled environment), and the potential to manufacture functional
product in the lab.
* The Pilot Coater process was shown to be reproducible, and capable of
manufacturing consistently performing strips, (as measured by color, reaction
time, hemolysis time and hemolysis degree).
* Protocol testing on the Pilot Coater yielded strips that surpassed the
performance of all previously manufactured strips, (as measured by color,
reaction time, hemolysis time and hemolysis degree). This process was
confirmed to be reproducible.
* Experimental results to date have led to designing a Pilot Coater
Optimization Experiment, to identify the design window for functional,
reproducible strips, to assure a satisfactory level of process robustness through
Cpk calculations, and, if satisfactory, to transfer process conditions to the
production process.
Table 6.1 Contributions of the Pilot Process Development Project
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6.2 Recommendations for Future Product Development Efforts at LifeScan.
The focus on a process technology strategy at LifeScan in the context of the
Quicksilver team's experience translates to specific recommendations for
future product development efforts at LifeScan. Such recommendations may
be categorized as technical recommendations, specifically derived from the
Quicksilver technical development effort, and strategic recommendations,
derived through applying the manufacturing decision category approach.
Technical Recommendations
* Continue to Utilize Designed Experiments and Cpk Calculations as Effective
Tools for Process Development.
The Quicksilver product is technologically more complex than any product
previously introduced by LifeScan. The existence of multiple interactions
between process variables renders "one factor at a time" experimentation
completely ineffective. Only through Designed Experiments can significant
process variables be identified, and their individual and combined effects be
measured and understood. Designed Experiments can lead to the
identification of a design window, (a range of process variable settings that
will yield acceptable response levels), as well as optimal settings for process
variables. However, while Designed Experiments may lead to defining a
range of process variables, an assessment of process robustness is a critical
next step.
Cpk calculations provide a measurement of process capability, and thus
process robustness. A Cpk calculation may be applied to the upper and lower
specification limits, as determined by the Designed Experiment's resulting
design window. The resulting Cpk value will provide a clear signal as to
whether the manufacturing process is robust enough (Cpk>1.33) to be
profitable. Very low Cpk values indicate that, despite the existence of a design
window, naturally occurring variation in the properties of the process
variable are likely to reduce yield to a point of significantly decreased, or
possibly negative profits. An extremely low Cpk value suggests the process
"can't get there from here"; i.e., investments of one type or another are
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required to increase process robustness. Such investments may include
working to reduce naturally occurring variation in a relevant process
variable. Such reductions in variation are not always possible, or may be cost
prohibitive. Alternative investments to increase process robustness therefore
include changing end product design, (to a less stringent design), and/or
relaxing product requirements.
In any case, Cpk is a diagnostic tool to assess process robustness, to alert a
company that additional investments may be required to improve process
robustness, in order to assure the development of a profitable manufacturing
process.
Strategic Recommendations
* Form Truly Autonomous Project Teams.
To support a strategic mission of new product development, LifeScan should
continue to break from a functional, highly centralized organization by
continuing to form cross-functional product development teams. However,
the "functional break" should be clean; i.e. the team should be truly
autonomous with members reporting directly to the team leader.
This structure will give the team its best chance to act as a team, not merely as
juxtaposed functions. In addition, this structure would enable team members
and the team leader to focus to the highest degree possible on the technical
development task at hand.
* Add an Advanced Process Function to Separate Process Invention from
Application.
LifeScan should support the addition of an Advanced Process function, or
equivalent function, to connect itself with external process technologies,
and/or to enable internal development of process technologies required for
new product development. Members of this function would work to
establish a bank of proven process technologies from which product
development teams could draw.
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* Consider External Sourcing of Process Technologies.
LifeScan should consider external sources of process development. While
LifeScan promotes partnerships with external suppliers of product (raw
materials), partnerships with external suppliers of process seem to be
dismissed as not feasible. The chosen direction for Quicksilver was clearly
one of internal process development. During the Quicksilver development
effort, an external process supplier with expertise in printing, coating and
converting was dismissed as a possible partner, primarily due to the
proprietary nature of the product and a desire for LifeScan to retain complete
ownership of process. This argument may be valid. However, assuming
this external supplier's process expertise was directly applicable to
Quicksilver's needs, the trade-off in deciding to develop technology internally
is one of internal control and ownership of the process vs. time.
For future product development efforts, especially those where the timing of
product introduction is critical, external sourcing of process technology
should not necessarily be immediately dismissed. The trade-off between
ownership of process and expediting the development time should be
weighed; external sourcing of process technology should be viewed as
potentially viable.
· Invest in Process Technologies
The issue of investment in process technology should be pushed with
LifeScan management. Granted, return on investment in process
technologies, especially those not involving automation, is difficult to
quantify. A model of shared financial risk, between the Advanced Process
Function and the product development team is preferable. However, a "non-
quantifiable" justification to counteract a reluctance on management's part to
invest in process technologies consists of two concepts:
A. Linkages. The linkage between process technology investment and new
product development may be demonstrated by citing examples from other
companies that have successfully achieved LifeScan's strategic mission of
product innovation.
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B. Alternatives. Without investment in new process technologies, LifeScan
will remain a one-product company. Given a rapidly changing competitive
environment, where LifeScan has lost differentiation by technological
advantage, a lack of process technology investment will hand market
leadership over to a competitor.
Further complicating LifeScan's competitive environment is the entrance of
lower priced, off-brand strip manufacturers. This fuels the need for LifeScan
to invest in process technologies for two reasons:
1. new process technologies will improve the efficiency of the current
manufacturing process, leading to lower product costs.
2. new process technologies will lead to a broader product line, and will renew
LifeScan's image as technological leader in the home blood glucose
monitoring industry.
6.3 Conclusion
The Quicksilver development effort has provided many lessons transferable
to future product development teams at LifeScan. The team's process
development effort has shown that proper application of the right statistical
tools can accelerate process development, and thus prevent unnecessary
spending. While Taguchi Design is applicable when an up-front
understanding of the process is available, Response Surface Methodology,
which assumes little to know up-front process knowledge, is the more
appropriate Experimental Design choice. Experimental Design, however,
cannot stand alone as a process development tool. Any "design window"
determined by designed experiments must be evaluated in terms of process
robustness. Cpk analysis, is therefore a critical follow-up. Only when Cpk is
large enough to render the design space valid is Experimental Design an
effective process development tool.
On a broader level, the Quicksilver experience has demonstrated the need to
integrate a process technology strategy with a product development strategy.
The Quicksilver development effort has lasted three years thus far. This
extended product development time is largely attributable to the fact that the
invention of process technology was forced to occur during the critical path of
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product development. With an intensifying competitive environment,
LifeScan cannot afford a three+ year development cycle.
A process technology strategy, which promotes process invention in advance
of application to a development effort, can fuel LifeScan with the bank of
technologies needed for product innovation. By providing several examples,
the thesis has shown that those companies who have focused on process
technology and an associated strategy have benefited through shortened
product development cycles, have remained competitive in their respective
industry, and/or have attained competitive advantage purely from mastering
a particular process technology.
In 1994, LifeScan's market leadership position holds, but this hold is by no
means guaranteed to last. In fact, recent (within the last two years) market
entrants have already gained significant market share (close to 10%) by
presenting what appears to be equivalent product technology at a lower price.
LifeScan's history teaches that innovation can lead to market leadership.
LifeScan's competitors are also well aware of this fact. From LifeScan's
perspective, investing in new process technologies is not without risk.
However, the intensifying competitive environment dictates that the degree
of risk of investing is far outweighed by the risk associated with not investing.
In other words, a status quo product development strategy, which excludes a
process technology strategy, is an invitation for competitors to innovate first,
and to severely threaten LifeScan's market leadership position.
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